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Family Structure and Income During Childhood and 
Subsequent Prosocial Behavior in Young Adulthood
Abstract
Models of young adults’ prosocial behavior—charitable giving and volunteering—are
estimated as functions of family structure and income during the stages of childhood.  Estimating
a model of any subsequent outcome (prosocial or otherwise) as a function of stage-specific
family structure and income imposes a set of restrictions on the underlying dynamic model of the
child development process.  Such restrictions have been implicitly and unknowingly imposed by
the family structure specifications used in past research, and in some cases the past restrictions
may not be sensible a priori.  We consider several specifications used in past research, propose
several new specifications with a priori sensible restrictions, and use Bayesian model
comparison methods to choose among them.  The models are estimated using data from the
Panel Study of Income Dynamics and its new module the Center on Philanthropy Panel Study. 
The results indicate that the development of charitable giving and volunteering behavior is
associated with family instability and low income in adolescence.
Family Structure and Income During Childhood and 
Subsequent Prosocial Behavior in Young Adulthood
1. Introduction
There is extensive research in psychology on the development of prosocial behavior
among children (Eisenberg and Fabes 1998), but almost none of this research is about what
actually occurs within families and how what actually occurs is associated with children’s
prosocial development (Grusec 1991a).  There is extensive research in demography on the
association between what actually occurs within families during childhood—family structure
instability and low income—and young adult’s achievement outcomes and risky behavior
(McLanahan and Sandefur 1994 and Duncan and Brooks-Gunn 1997), but almost none of this
research is about children’s prosocial development.  However, family instability and low income
are thought to affect achievement and risk outcomes by disrupting the same developmental
processes that are also important in the development of prosocial behavior (Chase-Lansdale et al.
1995).  Therefore we ask, Are family structure instability and low income during childhood
negatively associated with prosocial behavior in young adulthood? 
To answer this question we present evidence from regressions of prosocial behavior on
specifications of childhood family structure and income.  We examine two domains of young
adult prosocial behavior: charitable giving and volunteering.  The specifications are based on a
conceptual model in which prosocial development occurs in stages; therefore the specifications
of family structure and income are allowed to differ according to childhood stage.  The
regressions are estimated using data from the 1968-2003 waves of the Panel Study of Income
Dynamics and its new philanthropy module called the Center on Philanthropy Panel Study.  The
estimates indicate that family structure transitions and low income during adolescence are
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negatively associated with subsequent charitable giving and that low income during adolescence
is negatively associated with subsequent volunteering.
The results are important for three reasons.  First, although stage-based theories of
prosocial development are central in psychology and have been supported by evidence from
young children’s laboratory behavior, our results are the first evidence that a stage-based theory
is also necessary for understanding policy-relevant prosocial behavior in young adulthood. 
Moreover, the results point to adolescence as a sensitive stage in the development of charitable
giving and volunteering.  Second, the results extend the demographic literature about the
association between family structure and income and children’s personal outcomes (achievement
and risky behavior) to include children’s prosocial outcomes.  Third, charitable giving and
volunteering are important aspects of American civil society but are in decline among the post-
1965 cohort relative to previous cohorts (Putnam 2000).  At the same time it is well-known that
the post-1965 cohort experienced increased family instability and incidence of low income.  Our
results suggest that the decline in charitable giving and volunteering is, at least in part, associated
with increased family instability and incidence of low income.  
Finally, we make two methodological contributions that will be of general interest to
those doing demographic research on the association between family structure and income and
children’s outcomes.  First, we show how family structure specifications typically used in
previous research implicitly impose substantive restrictions on the underlying stage-based
dynamic model of child development—restrictions that are unintended and unrecognized, but
necessary for identification in the regressions.  Some restrictions implicitly imposed by typical
family structure specifications may be sensible, but others are not.  Even among a prioi sensible
identifying restrictions several sets of restrictions are always available, making it unlikely that
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researchers will agree a priori about which set of restrictions should be used.  A resolution is to
use model comparison techniques to ex post indicate which set of identifying restrictions best fits
the data.  Our second methodological contribution is to carry out the model comparison using
Bayesian methods.
2. Background
2.1  Prosocial behavior develops in stages and can be increased by parental investments.
Eisenberg and her colleagues (1982, 1983, 1986, 1987, 1989) have studied how children
respond to various moral dilemmas, and argue that prosocial moral reasoning develops in stages:
primitive empathy (pre-school and early elementary), approval-driven (elementary aged children
through high school), empathic orientation (late elementary through high school), and
internalized values (high school, and relatively rare even then).  Progression through the stages
involves both empathic and cognitive development.  The progression is invariant (a later stage
cannot be reached without first completing the earlier stages), and all stages are judged to be
important.  For example, the earliest years of childhood are important because empathy as well as
prosocial behavior can appear as early as year two (Zahn-Waxler, Radke-Yarrow, Wagner and
Chapman 1992); the early years are also important to prosocial development because of cognitive
growth during those years.  The empathic orientation stage is important because people reaching
that stage are inclined to help others even if not rewarded with social approval and even if those
being helped are conceptualized in an abstract way.  In other words people reaching the empathic
orientation stage have the ability to take the perspective of “those in need” rather than only being
able to take the perspective of someone they know who is in need; again this requires a
combination of both empathic and cognitive development (Hoffman 2000).  The internalized
See the reviews by Eisenberg and Fabes (1998) and Grusec (1991b).  Most, though not1
all, experiments have found that empathy-based verbal exhortations have a positive effect on
children’s donations (see, e.g., Dlugokinski and Firestone 1974, Grusec et al. 1978b and
Eisenberg-Berg and Geisheker 1979; cf. Lipscomb et al. 1983).  The evidence that dispositional
praise (i.e., attributing the child’s helpfulness to his or her helpful disposition) produces long
term effects and even promotes additional types of helping behavior besides that which was
initially praised is in the work of Gelfand et al. (1975), Grusec et al. (1978a), Grusec and Redler
(1980), Eisenberg et al. (1987), and Mills and Grusec (1989).  The second of these results may
obtain only with older children (Grusec and Redler 1980).
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value stage is development beyond empathic orientation so that helping others in need becomes a
an internalized value guiding one’s actions.  There is evidence that internalized values mediate
empathy in influencing prosocial behavior (Bekkers and Wilhelm 2007).
Experimental methods have shown that adults can increase the prosocial behavior of
children by modeling the desired behavior, by empathy-based verbal exhortations (“other-
oriented induction”), and by dispositional praise.   These results suggest “investments” a parent1
can make in her child’s prosocial development.  In addition to these investments, parental
expression of care and warmth to children likely increases children’s prosocial development.  For
example, the development of empathy in the earliest years of childhood is positively correlated
with mothers’ warmth, sensitivity, and responsiveness (Zahn-Waxler, Radke-Yarrow and King
1979).  Indeed, Chase-Lansdale et al. (1995) regard care and warmth as central requirements for
the development of caring in children because, they argue, children learn how to care by being
the recipient of care (parents modeling prosocial behavior).  Evidence backing-up this argument
comes from Wuthnow’s (1995) study of teenage volunteers and Soenens, Duriez, Vansteenkiste
and Goossens’ (2007) study of adolescents’ perspective-taking.  In addition, social learning
theory (Bandura 1977) applied to parental prosocial modeling suggests that children will more
readily adopt the model if they have a close, warm attachment to the parent-modelers. 
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A parent also can invest in her children’s prosocial development by providing them with
opportunities to help others (Eisenberg 1990).  In addition, a parent may indirectly encourage
prosocial development  by assigning chores.  For instance, Grusec, Goodnow and Cohen (1996)
find evidence that older children (aged 12-14) who are expected to do chores that benefit the
entire family, as opposed to just themselves, are more frequent spontaneous helpers, not only in
spontaneous situations similar to their chores, but in more general situations of helping family
members (also see Eisenberg and Fabes 1998, p. 720).
2.2  Family structure instability and low income are negatively associated with child outcomes. 
There is much evidence that non-intact family structures are associated with a wide range
of children’s negative outcomes: lower achievement test scores, problem behaviors, dropping out
of high school, neither being employed or in school, early childbearing, distress, and smoking
(e.g., see McLanahan and Sandefur 1994).  Similarly, low income during childhood is associated
with negative outcomes (e.g., see Duncan and Brooks-Gunn 1997).  The controversy is about
whether the associations are causal (e.g., see Cherlin et al. 1991 for family structure and Shea
2000 for income).  
As for income, Duncan et al. 1998 (see also Levy and Duncan 2002) draw on the child
development literature to argue that it is important to specify income during childhood by
childhood stage.  This suggests that an analysis may not find evidence of an association (much
less causality) if it misspecifies childhood income by aggregating income across stages.  The
same argument applies to family structure—it may important to specify family structure during
childhood by childhood stage.  However, only a few papers specify family structure or income by
childhood stage.  Of these papers, our analysis is closest in spirit to the work done by Hill et al.
Ermisch and Francesconi (2001) specify having been in a single parent family by stage2
and find that most of the negative associations with child outcomes are due to being in a single
parent family in early childhood.  Fronstin et al. (2001) specify divorce by stage and find
negative associations between divorce and educational achievement for divorce in any stage. 
There are some papers where family structure is studied in a particular stage; for example Painter
and Levine (2000) study the association between family structure during adolescence and older
teens’ education and non-marital fertility.
-6-
(2001) and Duncan et al. (1998) in their study of associations between stage-specific family
structure and income with completed education and non-marital births.2
To the extent that causality is behind the negative associations, the suspected mechanism
is stress that family instability and low income create in the lives of children.  With divorce,
stress is on the custodial parent (usually the mother) because of the trauma of the disintegrated
relationship and the need to shoulder all of the economic and parenting responsibility for the
children.  In addition to the effects children experience via the parent’s stress, they directly
experience the trauma of divorce through their own emotional upheaval.  Stress in children can
also be induced when the mother remarries and relationships between all members of the family
must adjust to the addition of the new step-father.  
Stress induced by having to survive on low income is thought to disrupt effective
parenting practices and produce harsh parent-child interactions (see, e.g., Conger and Elder 1994,
McLanahan and Sandefur 1994, McLoyd et al. 1990, 1994; cf. Hanson, McLanahan and
Thompson 1997).  There is evidence that the effects of stress are mediated through a parent’s
mental health and emotions (Conger et al. 1994; McLoyd et al. 1994) as well as anger and
hostility (Conger et al. 1994, 1997).  McLoyd et al. (1994) also find evidence that economically-
induced stress reduces the quality of the parent-child relationship.  
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2.3  Stress induced by family instability and low income can also affect prosocial development.
Stress can affect all the types of investment a parent makes in children’s prosocial
development.  The need to take full economic responsibility for the children after a divorce
makes less time available for investment in children’s cognitive development and less time
available for providing children with opportunities to help others.  A parent experiencing stress
due to divorce or low income must focus on her own family’s cohesion and survival, and
understandably may be less attentive to the needs of people outside the family (implying less
modeling of charitable giving and volunteering through organizations, less emphasis on helping
people outside the family in everyday encounters, and less frequent provision of the opportunities
for children to participate in such help).  Stress may affect the parent’s mental health, anger, and
hostility thereby leading to a less nurturing parenting style (implying less use of other-oriented
induction and dispositional praise) and a less warm and close parent-child relationship (implying
less chance for children to learn how to care by being the recipient of care).  Children’s own
anger about divorce or remarriage may make them less attentive to the needs of others because
difficulty in regulating emotion is thought to inhibit empathic responses (Eisenberg 2002).
In addition to the effect through stress, low income obviously affects the investments
parents can make in their children’s cognitive development, such as adequate nutrition, health
care, and the purchase of stimulating toys, books, and educational experiences (e.g., see Hanson
et al. 1997; Smith, Brooks-Gunn and Klebanov 1997, and Brooks-Gunn and Duncan 1997).  
Reduced cognitive investment may inhibit the development of perspective-taking ability. 
Similarly aside from any induced stress, low income constrains all kinds of family spending and
therefore reduces a parent’s ability to model charitable giving.  
Although we have described many reasons to suspect how family instability and low
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income might have negative affects on prosocial development there are at least three ways in
which a positive association might arise.  First, a parent dealing with family instability or low
income may require children to take on more responsibility for household chores, which in turn
might lead to increased helpfulness in other areas.  This possibility is supported by Call et al.’s
(1995) finding that adolescents in low-income families (though not in single-parent families) do
more household chores and spend more time caring for younger children and elderly members of
the family.  Second, experiencing family instability or low income may increase a child’s ability
to take the perspective of others experiencing hardship.  Third, in some families a divorce
relieves the stress experienced by children whose parents are in open marital conflict—the stress
relief hypothesis (see, e.g., Amato and Booth 1997, Furstenberg and Cherlin 1991, Musick,
Meier and Bumpass 2006).  Amato and Booth (1997, p. 220) report that less than one-third of the
divorces in their data involved high-conflict marriages, and to the extent that this is also true in
our data we expect the divorce we observe will predominantly indicate stress creation rather than
stress relief.
Despite the many reasons to suspect that family instability and low income are risk
factors for prosocial development, and the recognition of this in the literature (Chase-Lansdale et
al. 1995), little is known about whether these risk factors actually are associated with prosocial
behavior.  Only one previous study estimates the association between family structure and
income and prosocial behavior in young adulthood.  Brown and Lichter (forthcoming) use the
2002 NLSY Young Adult Supplement to estimate the association between volunteering incidence
among 18-25 year olds (i.e., whether or not the 18-25 year old does any volunteering) and the
years spent in poverty during childhood and whether the young adult was born to a single mother. 
Both associations are negative, but small and insignificant once current characteristics of the 18-
Lichter et al. (2002) conduct a similar study with a focus on volunteering incidence3
among 14-18 year olds.  They report two negative associations: (i) between time spent in a
female-headed household and adolescent girls’ volunteering for the mentoring of youth and (ii)
between time spent in a female-headed household and being born to a teen mother on adolescent
boys’ church-related volunteering.  Time spent in poverty had a significantly positive effect on
boys’ church-related volunteering.
There is a vast literature on charitable giving (e.g., see Vesterlund 2006) and volunteering
(e.g., see Wilson 2000), but none of it deals with family instability and low income during
childhood.
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25 year olds are included in the model.3
2.4  Summary and limitations of previous research
The psychology literature has been successful in establishing that a stage-based theory of
prosocial development is necessary to explain prosocial behavior in experiments, but there is no
research on the necessity of stage-based theory for explaining young adult’s charitable giving or
volunteering—policy-relevant prosocial behavior of interest to sociologists, economists, and
policy-makers.  Further, there is no evidence on whether the development of giving and
volunteering is especially sensitive to what happens in the lives of children during any particular
prosocial developmental stage.
The literature on children’s outcomes has established links between what happens in the
lives of children (family instability and low income) and several important outcomes, but almost
none of this work is about prosocial behavioral outcomes—despite the recognition that prosocial
outcomes are important aspects of well-being (Moore et al. 1999, Moore and Halle 1999).  Also,
the majority of papers about family instability and low income during childhood and children’s
outcomes do not take the stages of childhood into account.
Because so few papers take the stages of childhood into account, there has been little
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work done on how family instability and low income should be specified by stage.  For instance,
Hill et al. (2001) present some estimates from a specification based on family structure “state”
(e.g., in a two-parent family, in a birth mother-only family, in a birth mother-stepfather family,
etc.) in each stage and some estimates from a specification based on family structure “events” 
(a divorce or the arrival of a step-parent through marriage or remarriage) in each stage, but there
is no indication about which specification is preferred.
Putting aside how a stage-based family structure should be specified, other questions
about family structure specification nevertheless have been long-standing in the literature.  The
other specification questions have included whether family structure at age 14 is an adequate
indication of family structure over longer periods of childhood (the “window” problem; Wolfe et
al. 1996), whether different types of family structures can be grouped together and whether
structure should be specified by events or by duration in states (Wojtkiewicz 1993; cf. Boggess
1998, p. 218), whether family structure events should be specified differently according to type
of transition or can transitions be grouped together regardless of type (Wu and Martinson 1993;
Wu 1996), and whether the family structure specification should be child-based or family-based
(Ginther and Pollak 2004).  These possible choices for family structure specification are non-
nested, and a coherent methodology for sorting through the possibilities has not emerged.
3. Conceptual Framework
3.1  A dynamic model of prosocial development
Our model of stage-based prosocial development uses the general framework laid out by
tCunha et al. (2005) to model cognitive and non-cognitive skill formation.  Prosocial capital (P )
t!1at a childhood stage (t) is a function of the prosocial capital formed in earlier stages (P ) and
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tpresent parental investment in the child’s prosocial capital (I ) :
t t t!1 tP   =  f (P  ,  I  ),  t = 1, 2, 3 (1)
Prosocial capital consists of skills such as the tendency to respond empathically to the needs of
others, the tendency to take another’s perspective, the ability to think of the needs of an abstract
0“other,” and adherence to a principle that one should help others in need (P  is the child’s level of
prosocial capital at birth and models a genetic basis for these tendencies).  As already discussed,
parental investments consist of care and warmth shown to the child, inductive parenting,
modeling prosocial behavior, providing opportunities for the child to help others (including chore
assignment), and cognitive investments.
TProsocial behavior in young adulthood (y ) is, in turn, a function of prosocial capital at
3the end of childhood (P ), observable young-adult socio-economic characteristics like income,
Teducation, race, and religious affiliation (represented by the row-vector x ), and unobservable,
Trandom influences (u ):
T 3 T Ty    =   P   ñ   +   x   è   +   u (2)
where ñ is a scalar and è a column-vector of parameters.
The dynamic model (1) and (2) is identical to the framework underlying much
demographic research on family structure and income during childhood and outcomes in young
Tadulthood.  For example, in demographic research y   might be high school completion by age 20
3and P  represents human capital at the end of childhood.  Often in demographic research, capital
at the end of childhood and earlier parental investments are not directly observable; likewise, we
3 tcannot observe P  and I  (t = 1, 2, 3) in our data.  The approach is then to argue that family
instability and low income reduce parental investment by inducing stress and tightening the
-12-
family’s budgets of time and money.  This leads to a reduced-form model based on (1) and (2):
T T Ty    =   F  ä   +   M  ë   +   C  ã   +   x   è   +   u (3)
where F and M are row-vectors describing family structure and income over all three stages of
childhood and ä and ë are corresponding column-vectors of parameters to be estimated (C is a
vector of other stage-specific childhood events, like residential moves and the mother’s labor
3force participation).  In short, prosocial capital P  is a complicated function of parental
investments throughout childhood and stage-specific family structure instability and low income
are markers for disruption in those investments.
3.2  Specifications of F and M impose restrictions on dynamic models of child development.
Although this approach is identical to that used in much previous demographic research,
previous research has not recognized that typical specifications of F and M impose restrictions
on (3), and thereby on the underlying dynamic model (1) and (2).  Using family structure to
illustrate, the restrictions are in terms of constraining different family structure histories to have
Tthe same association with y .  To make the illustration tractable assume that all possible family
structure histories are such that a child always lives with his birth mother and there are a
maximum of two changes in family structure during childhood.  This assumption holds for the
large majority of children (84 percent of our sample), and later we will discuss how we handle
family structure histories that do not fit this assumption.  Under this assumption there are 20
possible family structure histories, and these histories are listed in the first column, first 20 rows
of Table 1.
Specifying F to be a vector of 20 dummy variables to capture the histories in Table 1
Row 21 contains the children whose histories do not follow our assumption: the children4
do not live with their birth mothers throughout ages 0-16 or they experience three or more family
structure transitions.  Some of the family structure states these children experience can be
mapped to the nine state × stage variables, but the mapping depends on the specifics of the
history (and hence cannot be summarized in Table 1).  Further, the experience of living without
the birth mother has to be mapped to an additional three state × stage variables.
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would be a completely flexible specification of family structure, but specifying 20 variables is
not feasible because the sample sizes typically available are not large enough.  Table 1 column 2
contains the fractions of our sample with each of the 20 family structure histories; because our n
= 1,011, some of these fractions imply small cell sizes.  Estimating (3) with a more parsimonious
specification of F containing less than 20 dummy variables necessarily imposes restrictions on
Thow different family structure histories are associated with y .
For instance, an often-used specification of family structure is based on being in a family
structure state (in a two-parent family, in a birth mother mother-only family, in a birth mother-
stepfather family) during each of three childhood stages (early childhood, middle childhood, and
adolescence).  This state × stage specification of F contains the nine stage-specific dummy
variables listed in headings of columns 3-11 in Table 1.  The “1”s in the body of Table 1 show
how the 20 family structure histories map to the nine dummy variables.   The 20 × 9 matrix in4
Table 1 has rank 9, implying that the nine stage-specific variables impose 11 restrictions on the
complete set of 20 histories.  We use Gaussian elimination to uncover the 11 restrictions
displayed in Table 2.
Two of the restrictions are:
T-D1-S3  !  T-D1     =     T-D2-S3  !  T-D2    =    T-D3-S3  !  T-D3 (4)
where the initial state “T” indicates that the child started off in a two-parent family, “D1”
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indicates a divorce in stage 1, “S3” indicates a step-father joined in stage 3 (a remarriage), etc. 
The restriction is that the marginal effect of the stage 3 remarriage on the child’s prosocial capital
relative to the preceding divorce does not depend on the stage in which the divorce occurred. 
Restrictions like (4) are “within-initial state but across stages.”  One restriction in Table 2 is
“within-initial state and within stage”:
B-S3-D3    =    B-S3 (5)
where the initial state “B” indicates that the child started off in a birth mother-only family.  The
restriction is that a divorce following a stage 3 marriage has no additional effect on prosocial
capital relative to the effect of the marriage.  Finally, other restrictions are “across initial states
and across stages,” for example:
T-D2-S3  !  T-D2    =    B-S3  !  B. (6)
The restriction is that the marginal effect of a stage 3 remarriage following a stage 2 divorce in a
two-parent family is the same as the marginal effect of a stage 3 marriage in a birth mother-only
family.
Opinions will differ according to application and researcher as to whether restrictions (4)-
(6) are sensible.  If stress is the suspected mechanism and stage 3 developmentally more
Tinfluential than stage 1, the effect on y  of the additional stress from T-D3-S3 compared to  T-D3
would seem to be more than the additional stress from T-D1-S3 compared to T-D1, but
restriction (4) says the marginal effects are the same.  Researchers may disagree about the
sensibility of this restriction, but once the restriction is listed at least researchers can discuss why
they disagree.  However, some restrictions implied by the state × stage specification lack any
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intuition, such as:
B-S3    =    B-S1-D1   !   B-S1-D2   +   B-S2-D3 (7)
making it difficult to discuss whether the restriction is a priori sensible.
Another often-used specification of family structure is based on experiencing a family
structure event (a divorce or the arrival of a step-parent through marriage or remarriage) during
each of three childhood stages.  The event × stage specification of F contains six stage-specific
dummy variables plus two variables to indicate the T and B initial states.  Using eight variables
in the specification to describe 20 histories implies the 12 restrictions on the histories listed in
Table 3.  Some of the restrictions also appeared in the state × stage specification (e.g., (4)), but
others do not.  Hence, the two sets of restrictions are non-nested.
A third specification is that the sequence of family structure experiences matters, but not
the stage in which they occur (e.g., see Wojtkiewicz 1993; Hill et al. 2001).  This “sequence-
without-stages” specification implies restrictions like:  T-D1  =  T-D3  and  B-S1-D1  =  B-S2-
D3 (all of the restrictions are within-initial state but across stages).  The underlying assumption is
that the kind of transition (e.g., divorce) is the primary determinant of stress, with equal effects
on prosocial development regardless of the stage in which the transition occurs.  A fourth
specification is that the number of transitions is the primary determinant of stress, more so than
the kind of transition (Wu and Martinson 1993, Wu 1996).  A stage-specific version of this
specification implies restrictions like:  B-S3  =  T-D3  and  B-S2-D2 = T-D2-S2 (all of the
restrictions are across initial states but within-stage).
The psychology literature offers no guidance about which of these four sets of restrictions
would be most reasonable in an analysis of prosocial development.  The literature is clear that the
t tThe term “sensitive” is used by Cunha et al. (2005) to describe a stage in which Mf  / MI  5
>> 0.  Cunha et al. also use the term “complementarity” to indicate a positive effect of earlier
t t t!1investment on the productivity of investment in a later stage: M f  / MI  MP  > 0.2
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developmental stages are invariant, but invariance only implies the dynamic modeled in (1): the
current level of prosocial capital at a stage is a function of the prosocial capital formed through
earlier stages (children cannot effortlessly leap-frog into an advanced stage).  The literature does
not designate any one stage as especially “sensitive,” in other words a stage in which a disruption
of investment would be especially harmful to the formation of prosocial capital.   At the same5
time the specifications from the previous demographic research were not created with the
insights from the prosocial development literature in mind.  Therefore we consider four
additional specifications that embody various insights from the prosocial development literature.
We will give a brief description of the additional specifications, but full details are
described in Appendix Tables A.1-A.4; these tables make the restrictions placed on the 20 family
structure histories explicit.  The first specification places its restrictions on the middle and
adolescent stages, but allows a flexible specification of family structure events in early
childhood.  By allowing a lot of flexibility to estimate associations between family structure
events in early childhood and prosocial behavior in young adulthood, this “flexible early event”
specification embodies the insight that important milestones in the development of empathy and
cognition occur in the first few years of life.  
The second specification places its restrictions on the early and middle stages, but allows
a flexible specification of family structure events in adolescence.  By allowing a lot of flexibility
to estimate associations between adolescent family structure events and prosocial behavior, this
“flexible adolescent event” specification embodies the importance of the empathic orientation
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and internalized values stages in prosocial development.
The third specification groups family structure histories according to our presumptions
about the level of stress the histories create in the lives of children.  Events in adolescence are
presumed to be most stressful (because parents are less able to shield adolescents from the effects
of stress), especially when the family was relatively stable up until adolescence.  A single event
in early childhood is presumed to be low stress.  Two events happening across middle childhood-
to-adolescence are presumed to be equivalent in terms of stress, as are two events happening
across early-to-middle childhood.
The fourth specification emphasizes complementarity across stages (see footnote 5): an
event in a later stage has less effect when it is preceded by an earlier event.  In terms of prosocial
development, the assumption is that most of the disadvantage was already effected by the earlier
event.
4. Data
4.1  Childhood family structure and income in the Panel Study of Income Dynamics
Constructing the variables to describe family structure histories is painstaking work.  We
give a brief description of the work herein, but a more detailed description as well as the
computer programs that construct the variables are available upon request.  There are three steps
in the construction: construct a complete, year-by-year history of the child’s family structure
events; map the events to one of the 20 three-stage event histories discussed earlier (the
childhood stages are ages 0-5, 6-11, and 12-16); and map the event history to the eight
specifications of analysis variables. 
In carrying out these three steps we made two decisions to keep the analysis sample as
 Recalculation of the weights to adjust for the re-contact sample is underway at6
Michigan’s Survey Research Center.
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large as possible.  First, we treat missing years in a child’s family structure history differently
than has been done in previous research (Hill et al. 2001).  When there are missing years—for
example, the child is in a non-response family unit for some, though not all, years in a stage—we
keep the child in the sample despite the incomplete data, and assume that the child’s family
structure remained unchanged during the missing years.  Not surprisingly, children in non-
response families have more turbulent family structure histories, so our decision to keep them in
the sample whenever feasible creates a sample with more numerous structure transitions than
appear in previous research.
Second, we keep young adults in the sample who are part of the re-contact effort the
PSID initiated in 1992 to bring non-respondents back into the study.  The PSID assigns a zero
family weight to respondents in the re-contact sample, so to keep the re-contact young adults in
our analysis we assign a weight.   For a young adult in the re-contact sample who originated in6
the SRC nationally-representative sample we assign the average weight among non-recontact
SRC children; for a re-contact from the SEO low-income oversample we assign the average
weight among non-recontact SEO children.  The re-contact young adults make up about 20
percent of our sample.
4.1.1  Step 1: Construct the year-by-year family structure events
We begin by forming the sample of PSID respondents who are 25-33 year-old heads or
wives of family units in 2001, and who were born into the study (the 1968-1976 birth cohort). 
We require at least 25 years of age to avoid complications with the transition out of college, no
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more than 33 years of age so that we can observe all the years of childhood, and heads and wives
because the prosocial behavior measures are available for them.  There are 1,121 respondents
satisfying these conditions, but we drop eight who were not asked the philanthropy questions, 97
who were in family units non-responding in all of the years in one of the childhood stages, and
five who have missing data.  The analysis sample is n = 1,011.
Then we determine each child’s birth year using the 1968-2001 Individual File, the 1985-
2001 Marriage History File, and the Ego-Alter File.  When more than one birth year is reported
we choose the most frequently reported year.  If the most frequently reported year differs from
the year reported in either the Marriage History File, Ego-Alter File, or Lillard (2001), we
manually check all the available candidate years and choose the year that makes the most sense
given the conflicting reports.  Usually the most frequently reported year makes most sense.
We next determine with whom the child was residing at the time of the interview in the
calendar year during which the child was born, in the calendar year during which the child turned
age 1, . . ., through the interview in the calendar year during which the child turned 17.  For each
age the possibilities are {birth mother, step-mother, no mother} × {birth father, step-father, no
father}.  We identify the child’s mother and father from the 2001 Parent Identification File (we
treat adoptive parents as birth parents).  If both mother and father identification numbers appear
in the family listing we are done.  If only the mother appears we check for the presence of a step-
father.  If the mother is a head or wife we check for a step-father using the relationship-to-head
codes; if a partner (married or cohabiting) is found we designate him to be a step-father.  If a
partner is not found through relationship-to-head codes (perhaps because the mother was living
with her parents and therefore not a head or wife), we continue to search for partners by checking
the marital pairs indicator from the 1968-2001 Individual File, the pairwise relationships from
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the 1968-1985 Relationship File, and indicators of marriages since 1985 using the 1985-2001
Marriage History File.  When we find a step-father we back track through previous interviews to
locate the year he first moved into the family.  We also check all subsequent corrections to move-
in and move-out dates in the Individual File so that the determination of the years the step-father
spends in the child’s family unit are as accurate as possible.  When the child lives with his father
we search in the same way for step-mothers.
From the year-by-year history we can infer the sequence of family structure events.  A
family structure event is a change in any of the parent/step-parents the child resides with.  At
each interview, there are four kinds of events that might have happened since the last interview:
the birth mother moved in or out, the birth father moved in or out, a step-mother moved in or out,
or a step-father moved in or out.
4.1.2  Step 2:  Map the sequence of family structure events to one of 20 event histories
To create a parsimonious, three-stage description of family structure events we sort
children into three groups.  The first group is children who always reside with their birth mothers
and who experience two or fewer family structure events—the “few event” group.  Each child in
the few-event group is assigned one of the 20 event histories described in Section 3.  The second
group is children who always reside with their birth mothers but experience three or more family
structure events—the “many event” group (there are 54 children in this group).  We assign each
child an initial “anchoring” sequence capturing the first two events.  We create a set of three
“additional event” variables (one for each childhood stage) to indicate the number of events not
captured by the anchoring sequence.  We also assign each child a terminal anchoring sequence
capturing the last two events, and a corresponding set of additional event variables.  In step 3 we
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will use the initial anchoring sequence to create the “flexible early event” specification and the
terminal anchoring sequence to create the “flexible adolescent event” specification.
The third group is children who spend time in family units without their birth mothers. 
These children have four different types of event histories.  In the first type, the birth mother and
father separate and the child stays with the birth father; we assign this child one of the 20 event
histories just described, but also use three “not-with-birth-mother” dummy variables (one for
each stage) to indicate time spent without the birth mother.  In the second type, the birth mother
and father separate and the child moves between the residences of the mother and father.  The
second type can be handled just like the first type.  In the third type the child appears to spend
some of his first few years of life away from his birth mother.  This type arises because we have
not relied on the first year the child appears in a family listing to establish his birth year when
there is much other evidence to the contrary.  We assume the third type of child was really with
his birth mother from birth.  In the fourth type the child spends time away from both birth
parents.  We assign these children a history variable “N” (time spent with neither parent) and
treat these children differently according to which of the eight specifications we are constructing. 
One exception is when the child himself moves out from his parents while still 16 years old, but
in the year he turns 17 (n = 27); we ignore this event because we assume that the anchoring event
defined before the move is a better description of the child’s family structure history than
grouping the 16 year-old mover out with the more complicated histories of children who live
with neither parent earlier in their lives.
4.1.3  Step 3:  Map the family structure events to eight specifications for analysis
In step three we map the 20 event histories (and the histories involving time spent with
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neither parent) into the eight specifications: state × stage, event × stage, sequence without stages,
number of transitions × stage, flexible early event, flexible adolescent event, presumed stress
level, and complementarity across stages.
Table 4 compares our sequence without stages specification to the corresponding
specification in Hill et al. (2001) to understand the differences in the construction of event
histories.  In short, the table indicates that differences in the construction of the histories are
mostly due to our finding more histories with three-plus events, our inclusion of young adults
from the re-contact (Hill et al.’s histories were based on the 1968-1991 files, before the re-
contact effort began), our treatment of missing years in a child’s family structure history (Hill et
al. exclude children with any missing years), and our treatment of the last years of childhood (our
last year is age 16; Hill et al.’s last year is age 15 for the construction of histories, but they also
require that the child continue to be in a response family every year through age 20).
Table 4 column 1 contains the fractions in Hill et al.’s sample experiencing each of the
indicated histories.  Column 2 contains our specification, but we drop children who resided in a
non-response family unit in any childhood year and who lived apart from both parents at any time
during stage 3; this approximates Hill et al.’s sample selection requirements that children be
response in every wave from birth through age 20.  Also, for the moment, we classify a child in a
two-parent family whose father leaves but then returns (a “leave-returner”) as “T” and we ignore
the additional events (ignoring additional events reduces the fraction in the “other sequences”
category).  Although the fractions in columns 1 and 2 are not precisely equal, they are fairly
close.  In column 3 we re-classify children with leave-returner fathers from the “T” category to
“other.”  In column 4 we stop ignoring the additional events, and doing so moves many more
children into the “other” category (primarily from the two categories with two transitions, as
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expected).  In column 5 we bring the children from the recontact sample back in, and in column 6
we bring back in the children who resided in a non-response family for some childhood years or
who moved away from their parents in stage 3.  In both cases the fraction in two-parent families
drops and the fraction in the “other” category increases.
4.2  Family income during childhood
We create stage-specific family income by averaging total family income across the years
in each childhood stage.  If total family income is missing (because the child was in a non-
response family during some of the years in a stage) we average the available years.
4.3  Charitable giving and volunteering in the Center on Philanthropy Panel Study
The 2001 charitable giving data from the Center on Philanthropy Panel Study have
several advantages relative to other recent giving surveys: high response rate, extremely low
occurrence of missing data on giving, and a close match to the percentiles of charitable
deductions from the Internal Revenue Service data up to the ninetieth percentile (Wilhelm
2006a).  We use the Center Panel data to estimate models of secular giving.  Secular giving
combines responses from five questions about annual charitable giving for purposes of poverty
relief, health, education, combined purposes such as the United Way, Catholic Charities, the
United Jewish Appeal, etc., and a catch-all “other” category that includes giving to the arts,
environmental protection, neighborhood and community organizations, international relief, etc. 
Gifts to organizations engaged in these purposes are counted as “secular” even if the organization
has a religious affiliation.  Our secular giving variable does not include giving to churches,
A respondent is first asked about “donations specifically for religious purposes or7
spiritual development, for example to a church, synagogue, mosque, TV or radio ministry” and
directed to “not include donations to schools, hospitals, and other charities run by religious
organizations” because donations for these other purposes will be asked about later.
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synagogues, mosques, TV or radio ministries.7
Table 5 column 1 presents descriptive statistics for all young adults in the sample.  The
table shows that 43 percent of the young adults give to secular organizations, and that the average 
conditional gift (the average among those giving more than zero) is $493.  The distribution of
giving is skewed: the median gift is $200, much lower than the average.
The 2003 volunteering questions in the Center Panel were more extensive than in 2001,
therefore we use the 2003 data (Wilhelm 2006b).  The 2003 Center Panel estimate of
volunteering incidence for 25-34 year olds is very close to the estimate from the Bureau of Labor
Statistics’ (2003) estimate based on the Current Population Survey September supplement (27.1
versus 26.5 percent), but the Center Panel estimate of median hours per year conditional on
volunteering is higher (53 versus 36).  The higher reported hours is most likely due to the more
extensive memory recall prompts in the Center Panel; extensive recall prompts may also explain
why the Center Panel has much less missing data on hours volunteered than the CPS.  The
sample size drops to n = 954 when estimating the volunteering models because we lose 57 young
adults who were heads or wives in 2001 but not in 2003.
We estimate models of secular volunteering.  Secular volunteering combines responses
from six questions about annual volunteering through organizations that serve youth, seniors,
people in poor health, people in need, organizations seeking to bring about social change, and an
open-ended other category.  Table 5 column 1 shows that 25 percent of the young adults do some
volunteering.  Among those who volunteer the average hours per year is 123.  The distribution of
We use $29,000 as a cut-off for low-income to match in 2000 dollars the income8
category in Duncan et al. (1998).
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volunteering is skewed: the conditional median hours volunteered is 40 per year, much less than
the conditional average.
4.4  Other independent variables
Table 5 also lists the independent variables we use in the models.  The first two variables
show that 38 percent of the young adults spent some childhood years in a non-intact family and
29 percent had at least one stage of childhood in which their family’s average income was less
than $29,000.   Eighty-four percent of the young adults had at least one residential move during8
childhood, and 67 percent had at least one stage of childhood in which their mother on average
worked 1,000 or more hours per year.  Average current income for the young adults is $40,135
(exp(10.6)).  Average past income is income averaged over the last five years (or as many of the
last five as are available).  Just over 50 percent of the young adults have education beyond high
school.  The rest of the variables describe religious affiliation (no affiliation is the omitted
category), race, southern residence, female headship, and age.
5.  Estimation  Methods
Our models have limited dependent variables (giving and volunteering are tobits), and our
eight alternative specifications of family structure are non-nested.  In this setting one estimation
approach is to use maximum likelihood to estimate the models and then use a Cox likelihood test
to do model comparison (Davidson and MacKinnon 2004, pp. 665-675).  However, the Cox test
has several disadvantages: little knowledge of the finite-sample properties of the bootstrapped
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test statistic, cumbersome testing when there are more than two specifications, and most
unsettling, the possibility for ambiguous test results.  Ambiguous test results are not uncommon
in applied work, and when they occur it is not clear how to interpret the predictions from the
various models under consideration.
Our motivation to use a Bayesian approach is that it allows our model comparison
problem to be handled in a more straightforward manner.  Because many readers may be less
accustomed to Bayesian methods, we provide a brief overview (see Koop 2003 and Geweke
2005 for more details).  In the Bayesian approach the “â  parameters” (our short-hand term for all
the parameters ä, ë, and è  in (3)) are assumed to be random variables.  Estimation proceeds by
Tselecting a prior density for the â  parameters, selecting a likelihood function for the y  (e.g,
Tassume the u  are normal), and writing down the posterior density of the â  parameters using
Bayes’ Theorem:
T T 0p(â, h |  y  )     %     p(y  | â, h)    p (â, h) (8)
T 0where p(y  | â, h) is the likelihood, p (â, h) is the prior density, and h / 1/ó .  Once the posterior2
Tdensity p(â, h |  y  ) is known, it can be used to estimate or predict any quantity of interest.  For
example, the mean â—analogous to the point estimate of the slope parameters in ordinary least
squares—is:
TE[â]     =    I  â   p(â, h |  y  ) d â. (9)
T TIn our models y  is either log charitable giving or log volunteer hours.  We assume the u
Tare normal, hence the likelihood function of the data y   is normal conditional on the â
parameters and h.  For the parameters’ prior density we use the independent normal-gamma
 Computations were done in part using the Bayesian Analysis, Computation, and9
Communication software (http://www.econ.umn.edu/~bacc) and in part using our own software. 
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0 0 0 0 0prior: p (â, h) = p (â)  p (h) where p (â) is normal and  p (h) is Gamma.  For most of the â 
parameters we set the mean of the prior density equal to zero and the standard deviation to .75. 
In a few cases we have good prior information about a parameter and set the prior accordingly
(e.g., we set the mean elasticity of giving with respect to current young adult income at 1.0 and
the standard deviation at .5).  We set the prior mean of h to be   where  comes from
maximum likelihood estimation of the model.  We understand that some may question these
settings, so acccordingly we give the prior density very little weight relative to the data by setting
the prior’s degrees of freedom to only five (compared to the data’s n = 1,011).
TThe posterior density p(â, h |  y  ) cannot be analytically solved, but can be simulated. 
We use the Gibbs sampler with data augmentation to simulate the posterior density of the
parameters (see Koop 2003 and Geweke 2005; the algorithm was developed by Chib 1992).  We
take 1,000 burn-in draws from the posterior density to allow the effect of the initial draw to
dissipate.  We then take 50,000 additional draws, but to mitigate autocorrelation among
successive draws we thin the chain of draws by using only one out of every five draws, leaving
us with 10,000 draws from each parameter’s posterior density.  We check convergence of the
thinned chain by making sure that the 10,000 draws are not autocorrelated and by checking
Geweke’s convergence diagnostic (a test of the equality of two means, where the first mean is
calculated using the first 1,000 draws and the second using the last 4,000; see Koop 2003, p. 66). 
In the future we plan to conduct the simulation so that it is robust against heteroskedastic errors
(Lancaster 2004, pp. 159-161).9
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The starting point for Bayesian model comparison is to re-write equation (8) to show
iexplicit dependence on the particular specification of family structure being used (M ):
T i 0 i    p(y  | â, h, M )    p (â, h | M )
T ip(â, h |  y , M  )     =    ÕÕÕÕÕÕÕÕ   (8')
T i                                                                                        p(y  | M ) 
T iwhere  p(y  | M ) is called the “marginal likelihood.”  If we had an estimate of the marginal
i ilikelihood and a prior belief about the probability (p(M )) that M  is the correct model we could
i Tuse Bayes Theorem again to calculate the posterior model probability p(M  | y )—the posterior
iprobability that M  is the correct model.  More accurately, we can calculate a posterior odds ratio
2 T 1 Tbetween two models—p(M  | y )/p(M  | y )—along with an assumption that our set of models is
1 T 2 T 1 Texhaustive (p(M  | y ) + p(M  | y ) = 1) to calculate the posterior model probabilities p(M  | y )
2 Tand p(M  | y ).  Extending the procedure to compare more than two models is straightforward.
Ambiguity can still arise when more than one specification has a non-negligible
probability (e.g., if there are two specifications and the posterior model probabilities of both are
.5), but the ambiguity can be handled in an intuitively appealing way: the posterior of any
quantity of interest is a posterior model probability-weighted average of the densities from the
models with a non-negligible probability—Bayesian model averaging.
We estimate the marginal likelihood in the following way.  After simulating the
iparameters’ posterior densities for each of the eight model specifications (denoted M , i = 1,...,8)
T iwe estimate the eight marginal likelihoods p(y  | M ) using the Gelfand-Dey method (Koop pp.
104-106).  Using the marginal likelihoods and assuming equal prior probability on each model
we calculate seven posterior odds ratios.  Assuming our eight model specifications are exhaustive
i Twe can solve for the eight p(M  | y ).
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We use these methods to compare different specifications of family structure, but we
have not yet used the methods to compare different specifications of income during childhood. 
However, results based on maximum likelihood methods indicate that stage-specific income
estimates are robust to functional form (Bandy and Wilhelm 2003).  
6.  Results
6.1  A first look at the association between prosocial behavior and childhood family structure
and income.
Before conducting the Bayesian analysis we take a first look at the association between
prosocial behavior and childhood family structure and income using simple methods.  Table 5
columns 2–5 split the sample first by ever having been in a non-intact family (columns 2 and 3)
and then by ever having been in a low-income family (columns 4 and 5).  Young adults who were
ever in a non-intact family are much less likely to make a charitable gift (33 percent versus 49
percent).  The average gift of those who give is also substantially smaller ($305 versus $573),
while the difference in medians is not as great ($175 versus $200).  The descriptive statistics are
different for volunteering: the differences between young adults who experienced non-intact
families and those who always experienced intact families are small, and the conditional median
among young adults who experienced non-intact families is higher (52 hours versus 36).
Comparing young adults who lived in a low-income family during at least one childhood
stage with those whose families were always middle or high income shows a charitable giving
pattern similar to the non-intact–intact pattern.  However, the low-income volunteering pattern is
not the same as the non-intact–intact volunteering pattern: those whose families had low income
during a childhood stage volunteer noticeably less (17 percent versus 28 percent), but when they
-30-
do volunteer they volunteer more hours.
The impressions from Table 5 are reinforced by the ordinary least-squares estimates in
Table 6.  For each of the three prosocial behaviors we estimate a model with a single dummy
variable indicating that the young adult was in a non-intact family sometime during childhood,
and then a model adding a dummy variable that the young adult was in a family where average
income in any stage was less than $29,000.  The estimates from the log charitable giving model
indicate a large negative association with having been in a non-intact family.  The association
drops in magnitude but remains large when the low-income dummy variable is added.  Log
giving also has a large negative association with having been in a low-income family.
The log volunteering estimates are different: there is a weak association with having been
in a non-intact family and the association flips sign when the low-income dummy is added.  The
low-income dummy itself has a large negative association with volunteering.
6.2 Bayesian analysis of charitable giving
Bayesian analysis of the log charitable giving model begins by simulating the posterior
parameter density for each of the eight family structure specifications, and calculating the eight
i Tposterior model probabilities  p(M  | y )  listed in Table 7 (the â  parameters now include the other
independent variables listed in Table 5).  Table 7, column 1 indicates that the number of
transitions family structure has the highest posterior model probability:.47, just over twice the
next highest probability of .22 for the specification based on complimentarity across stages.  All
of the other family structure specifications have posterior probabilities.13 or less.  
When we look at the number of transitions specification, the posterior density for the
parameter describing one Stage 3 transition is very similar to the posterior density for the
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parameter describing two or more Stage 3 transitions.  Therefore we estimate a specification with
a single dummy variable indicating any transition in Stage 3: the posterior model probability is
2.5 times the posterior model probability of the number of transitions specification, suggesting
that the any transition specification is much more likely to be the correct specification.  We
extend the specification to include any-transition dummies in Stages 1 and 2 and re-calculate the
posterior model probabilities shown in Table 7, column 2: the any transition specification is the
best specification by far—the posterior model probability is .66.
Next, we summarize information about the posterior density for the â parameters in the
any transitions specification.  Figure 1 shows a kernel density estimate of the posterior density
for the parameter any-transition-in-Stage 3; the posterior density is normal (the dashed line is a
normal density for comparison).  Figure 1 shows the mean of the any-transition-in-Stage 3
parameter to be !.76 and the standard deviation .31.  Almost all of the posterior probability
(.994) lies to the left of zero.  Ninety-five percent of the probability is between the two horizontal
lines at !1.37 and  !.17—this is the 95 percent highest posterior density interval, analogous to a
confidence interval in classical statistics.  The same information about the posterior is
summarized in the Table 8 row 3.  The final column in row 3 contains the posterior odds ratio:
zero T Full T zerop(M  | y ) / p(M  | y ) where M  is a model where the any-transition-in-Stage 3 parameter is
Fullconstrained to be zero and M  is the full (unconstrained) model.  A small odds ratio is evidence
zeroagainst M  and in favor of the parameter’s belonging in the model; the .11 is strong evidence
that the any-transition-in-Stage 3 parameter belongs in the model.
The other rows in Table 8 describe features of the posterior densities for the other â
parameters as was just described for the any-transition-in-Stage 3 parameter.  To make reading
the table easier, we use bold font for the row when the one-sided probability (column 3) is .90 or
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greater.  However, it should be remembered that while the one-sided probability and highest
posterior density interval (columns 4 and 5) provide intuition about a parameter’s belonging in
the model, the final judgment should be based on the posterior odds ratio in column 6.
Stage 3 log family income (row 6) is positively associated with giving in young
adulthood.  The one-sided probability is one and the 95 percent highest posterior density interval
does not include zero.  Most importantly, the posterior odds ratio is very small (.05)—hence the
evidence that adolescent family income is positively associated with giving in young adulthood is
even stronger than the evidence that an adolescent family structure transition is negatively
associated with subsequent giving.  Obviously, this implies that low-income during adolescence
is negatively associated with subsequent young adult giving.  
There is some counter-intuitive evidence in Table 8 that a Stage 2 family structure
transition is positively associated with subsequent giving (row 2).  The one-sided probability is
.96, but the 95 percent highest posterior density interval includes zero and the posterior odds ratio
while less than one, is not very close to zero (.57).  In short, there is some evidence of a positive
association, but the magnitude of the association is likely small.  The strength of the evidence
does not approach that of the evidence concerning an adolescent family structure transition.
The posterior information summarized in Table 8 describes the association between the â
parameters and the latent log giving.  For a given set of young adult characteristics—e.g., a
white, college-educated Protestant woman, aged 30, currently heading a family with average
income ($40,000), and who experienced no family structure transitions and had average income
in childhood ($45,000)—the posterior density of the â parameters generates a posterior density of
latent log giving (calculated from equation 3).  Changing the characteristics (e.g., adding one
family structure transition in Stage 3) generates a second posterior density of latent log giving,
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and the difference between the first and second posterior densities can be used to generate
differences in estimates of quantities of interest such as the probability of giving or the amount
given conditional on making a gift.
For instance, compare the woman with the characteristics just listed to a second woman
with identical characteristics except the second woman had experienced a family structure
transition in Stage 3: the Stage 3 transition woman’s probability of giving is estimated to be ten
points lower (.50 versus .60).  Conditional on making a gift, the Stage 3 transition woman’s
giving is 30 percent less.
We estimated differences in the probability of giving and the conditional amount given
associated with differences in Stage 3 family income.  We compare two young women who had
the characteristics listed above except that the first had average family income throughout
childhood while the second was in a family averaging $10,000 per year less in Stage 3 (and
neither young adult had any family structure transitions during childhood).  The $10,000 less
income in Stage 3 is associated with a two point drop in the probability of giving, and conditional
on giving the amount given is seven percent less.  If the second woman was in a family whose
income was poverty level in Stage 3—$20,000 per year, compared to the first woman in a family
whose income was at the average of $50,000—the probability of giving is estimated to be ten
points lower and the conditional amount given 28 percent less.  The charitable giving of the
second woman is similar to the woman described earlier, who in adolescence lived in a family
with average income but experienced a family structure transition.
6.3 Bayesian analysis of  volunteering
Table 9 lists the eight posterior model probabilities from our analysis of log volunteering. 
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Unlike the giving analysis, no one family structure specification is clearly a better fit over the
others.  The most likely specification—state × stage—has a posterior model probability of only
.28.  This means that if we were to describe the posterior density of the state × stage specification
there would be a good chance (.72) that we would be describing a specification that did not
generate the data.  The event × stage specification is nearly as likely: the posterior model
probability is .23, and two other specifications have posterior model probabilities not much less
(flexible adolescent event and complementarity across stages).
With no one specification providing a clearly better fit over the others, one must look
across the posterior densities from all eight specifications to see if any systematic pattern
emerges.  Across five of the specifications (state × stage, flexible early event, flexible adolescent
event, presumptions about stress, and complementarity across stages) there is a negative
association between being in a birth mother only family and subsequent volunteering.  Therefore
we calculated the Bayesian model average (weighted by the probabilities in Table 9) across the
eight specifications of predicted (latent) log volunteering for a young adult in a birth mother-only
family throughout childhood to compare to a young adult in a two-parent family throughout
childhood.  The difference between the two densities (two-parent minus birth mother-only) of log
volunteering has mean .56 (s.d. = .29).  The probability is .97 that the difference is positive and
the 95 percent highest posterior density interval is .00 to 1.13.  Hence, there is some evidence
that growing up in a birth mother-only family is negatively associated with subsequent
volunteering.
Also across five specifications (state × stage, event × stage, number of transitions,
flexible adolescent event, and complementarity across stages) there is a positive association
between a marriage during middle childhood and subsequent volunteering.  We use Bayesian
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model averaging again to compare a young adult born into a birth mother-only family but whose
mother married in middle childhood to another young adult who lived in a birth mother-only
family throughout childhood.  The difference between the two densities of log volunteering has
mean 1.58 (s.d. = .37).  The probability is one that the difference is positive and the 95 percent
highest posterior density interval is .84 to 2.31.  Compared to growing up in a birth mother-only
family, a young adult whose mother married in middle childhood is predicted to do much more
volunteering.
Finally, there is a clear positive association between Stage 3 log family income and
volunteering in young adulthood.  The eight posterior densities for the Stage 3 income parameter
are similar across the family structure specifications.  The Bayesian model average of the eight
posterior densities indicate a mean association of .73 (std. dev. = .20).  The probability that the
Stage 3 income effect is positive is one.  The 95 percent highest posterior density interval is .35
to 1.11.  Finally, compare two women with the characteristics described in Section 6.2, except
that both women lived in a two-parent family throughout childhood, one woman’s family had
income at the poverty level in Stage 3 ($20,000 per year), while the other woman’s family had
income at the average in Stage 3 ($50,000).  For the woman with poverty level income in Stage
3, the probability of volunteering is estimated to be four points lower and the conditional number
of hours volunteered 19 percent less.
  
7.  Discussion and Conclusions
There are two main results.  First, both family instability and low income in adolescence
are negatively associated with subsequent charitable giving in young adulthood.  Second, low
income in adolescence is negatively associated with volunteering in young adulthood.  That the
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associations involve family instability and low-income in adolescence but not in other stages of
childhood indicates that stage-based theories of development constructed to explain prosocial
behavior in the laboratory are also necessary to explain policy-relevant prosocial behavior. 
Furthermore, the associations involving adolescence point to the empathic orientation and
internalized values stages of development as important stages in the development of socially
significant prosocial behavior.
A third result is that young adults who grew up in birth mother-only families do less
volunteering than young adults who grew up in two-parent families or than young adults who
started off in a birth mother-only family but whose mother married in middle childhood. 
The results extend the demographic literature on children’s outcomes.  Up until now, the
children’s outcomes literature had established that family instability and low income are
negatively associated with a range of children’s outcomes that can be classified as important
personal outcomes.  The present results indicate that the negative associations extend to
important prosocial outcomes as well.
The paper’s use of Bayesian model comparison methods suggests a coherent approach to
choose among a priori reasonable family structure specifications.  When a clearly better
specification emerges (as the any transition specification did in the analysis of charitable giving)
more confidence can be placed on the results from that specification.  When a clearly better
specification does not emerge (as in the analysis of volunteering) quantities of interest can still be
estimated by averaging the results from the possible specifications.  Although the paper
considered eight family structure specifications, those eight are, of course, not exhaustive. 
However, the approach in the paper can be used to evaluate additional family structure
specifications that might be of interest.
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Does the evidence of an association between family instability and low-income in
adolescence with subsequent prosocial behavior indicate causality?  That the family instability
and low-income in adolescence is measured at least nine years prior to the giving and
volunteering measurements rules out simultaneity, thereby suggesting some degree of causality. 
The counter-argument would have to be that there is an omitted variable correlated both with
young adult giving and volunteering and earlier family instability and low-income.  Further the
omitted variable would have to be correlated with family instability and low-income in
adolescence only, or else we would have seen the effects of the omitted variable in the
early/middle childhood family instability and low-income estimates as well.  Hence, we think an
omitted variable argument is more likely to undercut a causal explanation of the lower
volunteering done by young adults raised in birth mother-only families than it is to undercut a
causal explanation of the lower giving done by young adults who experienced family instability
and low-income in adolescence and the lower volunteering done by young adults who
experienced low-income in adolescence.  In addition, it is family instability and low-income at
the time of the empathic orientation and internalized values stages that we find to be negatively
associated with the giving and volunteering, prosocial behaviors that other work has found to be
positively correlated with successful completion of those stages (Bekkers and Wilhelm 2007).
While the adolescent timing of the associations we find makes conjectures about causality
reasonable, work evaluating causality using sibling fixed-effects is needed.  We are planning this
work.
Finally, even if one suspects causality behind the present evidence, the evidence does not
indicate which parental investments in children’s prosocial behavior—role modeling, other-
oriented induction, expression of care and warmth, praise, providing opportunities to help,
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cognitive development—might be disrupted by family instability and low income in adolescence. 
Data on adolescents’ charitable giving and volunteering, and helping others in the CDS have the
potential to reveal which parental investments in children’s prosocial behavior are disrupted by
family instability and low income.
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Table 1.  Family Structure Histories and a State × Stage Specification.
        Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3
                                        State:  Two biological parents 
                                                   Biological mother only
                                                   Biological mother and step-father
TP BM SF TP BM SF TP BM SF
Family Structure History
Sample
fraction
  1. Two-parent family, always (T) .613 1 . . 1 . . 1 . .
  2. Two parent, divorce stage 1 (T - D1) .032 1 1 . . 1 . . 1 .
  3. Two parent, divorce stage 1, stepfather stage 1 (T - D1 - S1) .004 1 1 1 . . 1 . . 1
  4. Two parent, divorce stage 1, stepfather stage 2 (T - D1 - S2) .015 1 1 . . 1 1 . . 1
  5. Two parent, divorce stage 1, stepfather stage 3 (T - D1 - S3) .003 1 1 . . 1 . . 1 1
  6. Two parent, divorce stage 2 (T - D2) .034 1 . . 1 1 . . 1 .
  7. Two parent, divorce stage 2, stepfather stage 2 (T - D2 - S2) .016 1 . . 1 1 1 . . 1
  8. Two parent, divorce stage 2, stepfather stage 3 (T - D2 - S3) .011 1 . . 1 1 . . 1 1
  9. Two parent, divorce stage 3 (T - D3) .037 1 . . 1 . . 1 1 .
10. Two parent, divorce stage 3, stepfather stage 3 (T - D3 - S3) .008 1 . . 1 . . 1 1 1
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Family Structure History (continued) TP BM SF TP BM SF TP BM SF
11. Birth mother only, always (B) .024 . 1 . . 1 . . 1 .
12. Birth mother, stepfather stage 1 (B - S1) .020 . 1 1 . . 1 . . 1
13. Birth mother, stepfather stage 1, divorce stage 1 (B - S1 - D1) .001 . 1 1 . 1 . . 1 .
14. Birth mother, stepfather stage 1, divorce stage 2 (B - S1 - D2) .007 . 1 1 . 1 1 . 1 .
15. Birth mother, stepfather stage 1, divorce stage 3 (B - S1 - D3) .003 . 1 1 . . 1 . 1 1
16. Birth mother, stepfather stage 2 (B - S2) .003 . 1 . . 1 1 . . 1
17. Birth mother, stepfather stage 2, divorce stage 2 (B - S2 - D2) .003 . 1 . . 1 1 . 1 .
18. Birth mother, stepfather stage 2, divorce stage 3 (B - S2 - D3) .003 . 1 . . 1 1 . 1 1
19. Birth mother, stepfather stage 3 (B - S3) .0004 . 1 . . 1 . . 1 1
20. Birth mother, stepfather stage 3, divorce stage 3 (B - S3 - D3) .003 . 1 . . 1 . . 1 1
21. None of the above .159 – – – – – – – – –
Fraction experiencing the state 1.000 .944 .204 .057 .892 .253 .124 .816 .258 .139
Notes: The sample fraction in column 2 is based on the weighted data.  Columns 3 - 11 show the map between the 20 family histories and the
nine state × stage variables (“.” indicates the variable is set to “zero,” but using “.” makes the table easier to read).  In any one stage a child can
spend time in more than one state (hence the within-state fractions in the last row do not add to one).
Children in row 21 are those who do not live with their birth mothers throughout ages 0-16 or who experience three or more family
structure transitions.  The nine state × stage variables in the column do not cover situations in which the child spends time away from the birth
mother; an additional variable per stage captures these situations (the fractions experiencing this state × stage are .026, .057, and .107).
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Table 2.  Restrictions Imposed by a State × Stage Specification of Family Structure.
State × stage   =   {ever with two-parent family, ever with birth mother only, ever with step-father}   
×   { stage 1, stage 2, stage 3 }
There are 20 possible family histories where the child is always with the birth mother and
experiences two or fewer transitions.  The state × stage specification contains nine variables, hence
there are 11 implicit restrictions:
T-D1-S2  ! T-D1 = T-D2-S2   !  T-D2
T-D1-S3  ! T-D1 = T-D2-S3   !  T-D2
T-D1-S3  ! T-D1 = T-D3-S3   !  T-D3
B-S2-D3  ! B-S2 = B-S1-D3   !  B-S1
B-S3-D3 = B-S3
B-S3  =  B-S1-D1   !  B-S1-D2  +  B-S2-D3
B-S3 ! B  =  B-S2-D3   !  B-S2-D2
T-D2-S3  !  T-D2 =  B-S3         !  B
T-D2-S2  !  T-D2 =  B-S2         !  B
T-D3  !  T =  B-S2-D3   !  B-S2
T-D1-S2  !  T-D1-S1  = B-S2         !  B-S1
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Table 3.  Restrictions Imposed by an Event × Stage Specification of Family Structure.
Event × Stage   =   { divorce,  step-parent arrives }   ×   { stage 1, stage 2, stage 3 }
There are 20 possible family histories where the child is always with the birth mother and
experiences two or fewer transitions.  The specification contains six event × stage variables plus
two variables to describe the child’s initial state: born into a mother-only or two parent family. 
Hence there are 12 implicit restrictions:
T-D1-S1  ! T-D1 = B-S1  
B-S1-D1  ! T-D1 = B-S1  
B-S1-D2  ! B-S1 = T-D2  
T-D1-S2  ! T-D1 = B-S2  
T-D1-S2  ! T-D1 = B-S2-D2  !  T-D2
B-S1-D3  ! B-S1 = T-D3
B-S2-D3  ! (T-D1-S2  ! T-D1) = T-D3
T-D2-S2  ! T-D2 = T-D1-S2  ! T-D1
T-D1-S3  ! T-D1 = T-D2-S3  ! T-D2
T-D1-S3  ! T-D1 = T-D3-S3  ! T-D3
T-D1-S3  ! T-D1 = B-S3-D3  ! T-D3
T-D1-S3  ! T-D1 = B-S3
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Table 4.  Sequences Without Stages Specifications:  Comparing Two Samples.
Sample in Sample and classification in the present paper
Sequence
Hill et al.
(2001)
(1)
Sample
close to 
Hill et al.
(2)
Reclassify
leaver-returners
as “other”
(3)
Reclassify 
3+ events
as “other”
(4)
Include children from 
re-contact sample
(5)
Include children from
non-response families
and stage 3 movers out
(6)
Mother-only all years .030 .018 .018 .018 .024 .024
Mother-only to two-parent
   and remain two-parent 
.035 .024 .024 .022 .022 .020
Mother-only to two-parent
   and back to mother-only
.025 .028 .028 .015 .018 .016
Two-parent all years .685 .672 .660 .660 .640 .602
Two-parent to mother-only .085 .092 .092 .087 .092 .095
Two-parent to mother-only
   and back to two-parent
.080 .092 .092 .063 .061 .057
Other sequences .060 .074 .086 .134 .144 .185
Inclusion and classification
   decisions: 
Include children from
   re-contact sample
No No No No Yes Yes
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Include children ever in a
   non-response family or
   who moved from parents
    during stage 3
No No No No No Yes
Classify “leave-returners”
   as “other”
No
(probably)
No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Classify 3+ events
   as “other”
Yes No No Yes Yes Yes
n 1,325 800 800 800 915 1,011
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Table 5.  Descriptive Statistics.
                                 Sample:
Variable
All
(1)
Always
intact
(2)
Ever non-
intact
(3)
Always middle-
or high-income
(4)
Ever low-
income
(5)
Charitable giving
   Fraction giving .43 .49 .33 .48 .30
   Mean gift (conditional) 493
(1798)
573
(2125)
305
(416)
536
(1997)
327
(540)
   Median gift (conditional) 200 200 175 200 152
Volunteering
   Fraction volunteering .25 .26 .22 .28 .17
   Mean hours (conditional) 123
(261)
125
(293)
119
(189)
118
(268)
145
(232)
   Median hours (conditional) 40 36 52 40 48
Childhood family structure
     and income
Ever non-intact .38 0 1 .27 .66
Ever low-income .29 .16 .50 0 1
Other childhood events
     Ever moved during
          childhood (ages 0 - 16)
.84 .78 .94 .80 .93
     Mother ever averaged
          1,000+ work during
          childhood (ages 0 - 16)
.67 .63 .73 .68 .64
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Young adult characteristics
     Log young adult current
          incomea
10.6
(.81)
10.7
(.75)
10.3
(.84)
10.7
(.78)
10.3
(.84)
     Log young adult average
          past income
10.4
(.68)
10.6
(.63)
10.2
(.89)
10.6
(.64)
10.2
(.69)
     Any post-high school
          education
.52 .61 .39 .60 .33
     Catholic .21 .23 .17 .24 .17
     Protestant .43 .43 .42 .41 .46
     Jewish or other religious
          affiliation
.13 .14 .11 .13 .12
     African-American .15 .07 .27 .05 .37
     Resides in the south .39 .38 .42 .34 .52
     Female household head .27 .22 .34 .24 .33
     Age of household head 29 29 29 29 29
Sample sizes
   Charitable giving 1,011 584 427 604 407
   Volunteering 954 555 399 577 377
Notes:
 The 10.7 versus 10.3 difference in log incomes is $44,356 versus $29,733 in levels.a
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Table 6.  Prosocial Behavior Regressed on Ever in a Non-intact Family and Ever Low-income.
             Dependent variable:
Variable
Log charitable giving Log volunteering
Ever non-intact !.55
(.13)
!.39
(.14)
!.08
(.15)
.04
(.16)
Ever low-income ! !.47
(.14)
! !.35
(.15)
constant 1.53
(.09)
1.61
(.10)
.96
(.10)
1.02
(.10)
n 1,011 954
Notes:  The estimates are ordinary least-squares.
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Table 7.  Charitable Giving Models:  Posterior Model Probabilities for Eight Specifications.
Posterior model probability
Specification of family structure (1) (2)
   State × stage .02 .01
   Event × stage .08 .05
   Sequence without stages .03 .02
   Transitions
                  Number of transitions .47 –
                  Any transition – .66
   Flexible early event .01 .00
   Flexible adolescent event .05 .04
   Presumptions about stress .13 .08
   Complementarity across stages .22 .14
Notes:  The dependent variable is the log of charitable giving.  Column 1 contains the probabilities
using the number of transitions specification of family structure as one of the eight models.  In
column 2, the number of transitions specification is replaced with the any transition specification.
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Table 8.  Charitable Giving Model:  Posterior Distribution for the 
Any Transition Specification.
â  parameters
Mean
(1)
Std.
dev.
(2)
   Prob.
jâ   > 0 or
jâ   < 0 
(3)
95 percent
highest posterior
density interval
(4)
Posterior
odds for
jâ   = 0 
(5)
Stage 1 any transition .01 .31 .51 !.61 .62 2.55
Stage 2   any transition .50 .29 .96 !.07 1.08 .57
Stage 3   any transition !.76 .31 .99 !1.37 !.17 .11
Stage 1 log family income !.10 .32 .62 !.73 .54 2.21
Stage 2 log family income !.37 .36 .85 !1.07 .33 1.23
Stage 3 log family income .78 .28 1.00 .23 1.35 .05
Stage 1 family move .00 .25 .50 !.49 .49 3.11
Stage 2 family move !.04 .23 .57 !.49 .40 3.26
Stage 3 family move !.26 .24 .85 !.73 .21 1.81
Stage 1 mother averages 1,000+ hours .11 .28 .66 !.43 .66 2.54
Stage 2 mother averages 1,000+ hours !.14 .26 .71 !.66 .36 2.52
Stage 3 mother averages 1,000+ hours !.02 .25 .43 !.53 .46 2.98
Log young adult current income .94 .24 1.00 .48 1.43 .01
Log young adult average past income .38 .27 .92 !.16 .91 5.31
Any post-high school education .82 .17 1.00 .49 1.15 .00
Catholic !.12 .28 .66 !.67 .42 1.65
Protestant .34 .24 .92 !.13 .81 .75
Jewish or other religious affiliation .74 .30 .99 .15 1.34 .08
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African-American !1.91 .35 1.00 !2.59 !1.23 .00
Resides in the south .34 .22 .94 !.10 .77 1.15
Female !.04 .21 .57 !.46 .38 3.53
Age .07 .05 .94 !.02 .16 5.15
constant !19.9 2.7 1.00 !25.4 !14.7 0.00
Notes:  The table summaries the posterior density for the ä, ë, â  parameters of a log charitable giving
model specifying family structure with the number of transitions by stage (to ease discussion we will refer
to all of these parameters as “â  parameters”).  Dummy variables indicating missing data for education,
religious affiliation, and race are included in the model but not displayed.  
Column 1: Mean of the posterior density.
Column 2: Standard deviation of the posterior density.
j jColumn 3: One-sided posterior probability: P[â   > 0] when the mean of â   is positive;
j jP[â   < 0] when the mean of â   is negative.
jColumns 4 and 5: 95 percent highest posterior density interval—an interval centered at the mean of â  and
     capturing .95 of the posterior density.
zero T Full T zeroColumn 6: Posterior model probability odds ratio: p(M  | y ) / p(M  | y ) where M  is a model where
Full      the row variable is constrained to have zero effect on log giving and M  is the full
zero      (unconstrained) model.  A small odds ratio is evidence against M .
To ease finding the more important results, variables with one-sided probabilities greater than .90 are
printed in bold.
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Table 9.  Volunteering Models: Posterior Model Probabilities for Eight Specifications.
Specification of family structure
Posterior model probability
   State × stage .28
   Event × stage .23
   Sequence without stages .02
   Number of transitions .03
   Flexible early event .05
   Flexible adolescent event .16
   Presumptions about stress .09
   Complementarity across stages .14
Notes: The dependent variable is the log of volunteering hours.
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Table A.1.  Family Structure Histories and a Flexible Early Event Specification.
        Specification of variables
Family Structure History
Sample
fraction
Stage 1
marriage
Stage 1
divorce 
Stage 1
marriage
and
divorce
 Leaves 
stage 1
with 
one
parent
Leaves 
stage 1
with 
two
parents
 1. Two-parent family, always (T) .613 . . . . .
 2. Two parent, divorce stage 1 (T - D1) .032 . 1 . . .
 3. Two parent, divorce stage 1, stepfather stage 1 (T - D1 - S1) .004 . 1 . .
 4. Two parent, divorce stage 1, stepfather stage 2 (T - D1 - S2) .015 . 1 . . .
 5. Two parent, divorce stage 1, stepfather stage 3 (T - D1 - S3) .003 . 1 . . .
 6. Two parent, divorce stage 2 (T - D2) .034 . . . . 1
 7. Two parent, divorce stage 2, stepfather stage 2 (T - D2 - S2) .016 . . . . 1
 8. Two parent, divorce stage 2, stepfather stage 3 (T - D2 - S3) .011 . . . . 1
 9. Two parent, divorce stage 3 (T - D3) .037 . . . . 1
10. Two parent, divorce stage 3, stepfather stage 3 (T - D3 - S3) .008 . . . . 1
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Family Structure History (continued)
Sample
fraction
Stage 1
marriage
Stage 1
divorce 
Stage 1
marriage
and
divorce
 Leaves 
stage 1
with 
one
parent
Leaves 
stage 1
with 
two
parents
11. Birth mother only, always (B) .024 . . . . .
12. Birth mother, stepfather stage 1 (B - S1) .020 1 . . . .
13. Birth mother, stepfather stage 1, divorce stage 1 (B - S1 - D1) .001 . . 1 . .
14. Birth mother, stepfather stage 1, divorce stage 2 (B - S1 - D2) .007 1 . . . .
15. Birth mother, stepfather stage 1, divorce stage 3 (B - S1 - D3) .003 1 . . . .
16. Birth mother, stepfather stage 2 (B - S2) .003 . . . 1 .
17. Birth mother, stepfather stage 2, divorce stage 2 (B - S2 - D2) .003 . . . 1 .
18. Birth mother, stepfather stage 2, divorce stage 3 (B - S2 - D3) .003 . . . 1 .
19. Birth mother, stepfather stage 3 (B - S3) .0004 . . . 1 .
20. Birth mother, stepfather stage 3, divorce stage 3 (B - S3 - D3) .003 . . . 1 .
21. None of the above .159 – – – – –
Fraction 1.000 .037 .088 .026 .021 .176
Notes: “Leaves stage 1 with one parent” means that the child experienced no family structure events in stage 1, left stage 1 with one
parent, and experienced at least one family structure event in either stage 2 or 3; that is, the child was in a mother-only family at birth,
nothing happened through the end of stage 1, but something happened afterwards.  “Leaves stage 1 with two parents” means that the
child was in a two-parent family at birth, nothing happened through the end of stage 1, but something happened afterwards.  The other
variables in the specification are two-parent family throughout childhood (.616) and birth mother-only throughout childhood (.036).
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Table A.2.  Family Structure Histories and a Flexible Adolescent Event Specification.
        Specification of variables
Family Structure History
Sample
fraction
Leaves 
stage 2
with 
one
parent
Leaves 
stage 2
with 
two
parents
Stage 3
marriage
Stage 3
divorce
Stage 3
marriage
and
divorce
 1. Two-parent family, always (T) .613 . . . . .
 2. Two parent, divorce stage 1 (T - D1) .032 1 . . . .
 3. Two parent, divorce stage 1, stepfather stage 1 (T - D1 - S1) .004 . 1 . . .
 4. Two parent, divorce stage 1, stepfather stage 2 (T - D1 - S2) .015 . 1 . . .
 5. Two parent, divorce stage 1, stepfather stage 3 (T - D1 - S3) .003 . . 1 . .
 6. Two parent, divorce stage 2 (T - D2) .034 1 . . . .
 7. Two parent, divorce stage 2, stepfather stage 2 (T - D2 - S2) .016 . 1 . . .
 8. Two parent, divorce stage 2, stepfather stage 3 (T - D2 - S3) .011 . . 1 . .
 9. Two parent, divorce stage 3 (T - D3) .037 . . . 1 .
10. Two parent, divorce stage 3, stepfather stage 3 (T - D3 - S3) .008 . . . . 1
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Family Structure History (continued)
Sample
fraction
Leaves 
stage 2
with 
one
parent
Leaves 
stage 2
with 
two
parents
Stage 3
marriage
Stage 3
divorce
Stage 3
marriage
and
divorce
11. Birth mother only, always (B) .024 . . . . .
12. Birth mother, stepfather stage 1 (B - S1) .020 . 1 . . .
13. Birth mother, stepfather stage 1, divorce stage 1 (B - S1 - D1) .001 1 . . . .
14. Birth mother, stepfather stage 1, divorce stage 2 (B - S1 - D2) .007 1 . . . .
15. Birth mother, stepfather stage 1, divorce stage 3 (B - S1 - D3) .003 . . . 1 .
16. Birth mother, stepfather stage 2 (B - S2) .003 . 1 . . .
17. Birth mother, stepfather stage 2, divorce stage 2 (B - S2 - D2) .003 1 . . . .
18. Birth mother, stepfather stage 2, divorce stage 3 (B - S2 - D3) .003 . . . 1 .
19. Birth mother, stepfather stage 3 (B - S3) .0004 . . 1 . .
20. Birth mother, stepfather stage 3, divorce stage 3 (B - S3 - D3) .003 . . . . 1
21. None of the above .159 – – – – –
Fraction 1.000 .118 .068 .027 .096 .039
Notes: “Leaves stage 2 with one parent” means that the child experienced at least one family structure event in stage 1 or 2, and left
stage 2 with one only parent (e.g., was not in a birth mother-stepfather family).  “Leaves stage 2 with two parents” that the child
experienced at least one family structure event in stage 1 or 2, but left stage 2 with two parent (e.g., in a birth mother-stepfather
family). The other variables in the specification are two-parent family throughout childhood (.616) and birth mother-only throughout
childhood (.036).
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Table A.3.  Family Structure Histories and Our Presumptions about Stress Specification.
        Specification of variables
Family Structure History
Sample
fraction
Relatively
stable
birth
mother
only
Two
events
in
stages
1 and 2
Two
events
in
stages
2 and 3
Rel.
stable
then one
stage 3
event
Stage 1
and
stage 3
event or
two
stage 3
events
 1. Two-parent family, always (T) .613 . . . . .
 2. Two parent, divorce stage 1 (T - D1) .032 1 . . . .
 3. Two parent, divorce stage 1, stepfather stage 1 (T - D1 - S1) .004 . 1 . . .
 4. Two parent, divorce stage 1, stepfather stage 2 (T - D1 - S2) .015 . 1 . . .
 5. Two parent, divorce stage 1, stepfather stage 3 (T - D1 - S3) .003 . . . . 1
 6. Two parent, divorce stage 2 (T - D2) .034 . . . . .
 7. Two parent, divorce stage 2, stepfather stage 2 (T - D2 - S2) .016 . . 1 . .
 8. Two parent, divorce stage 2, stepfather stage 3 (T - D2 - S3) .011 . . 1 . .
 9. Two parent, divorce stage 3 (T - D3) .037 . . . 1 .
10. Two parent, divorce stage 3, stepfather stage 3 (T - D3 - S3) .008 . . . . 1
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Family Structure History (continued)
Sample
fraction
Relatively
stable
birth
mother
only
Two
events
in
stages
1 and 2
Two
events
in
stages
2 and 3
Rel.
stable
then one
stage 3
event
Stage 1
and
stage 3
event or
two
stage 3
events
11. Birth mother only, always (B) .024 1 . . . .
12. Birth mother, stepfather stage 1 (B - S1) .020 . . . . .
13. Birth mother, stepfather stage 1, divorce stage 1 (B - S1 - D1) .001 . 1 . . .
14. Birth mother, stepfather stage 1, divorce stage 2 (B - S1 - D2) .007 . 1 . . .
15. Birth mother, stepfather stage 1, divorce stage 3 (B - S1 - D3) .003 . . . . 1
16. Birth mother, stepfather stage 2 (B - S2) .003 . . . . .
17. Birth mother, stepfather stage 2, divorce stage 2 (B - S2 - D2) .003 . . 1 . .
18. Birth mother, stepfather stage 2, divorce stage 3 (B - S2 - D3) .003 . . 1 . .
19. Birth mother, stepfather stage 3 (B - S3) .0004 . . . 1 .
20. Birth mother, stepfather stage 3, divorce stage 3 (B - S3 - D3) .003 . . . . 1
21. None of the above .159 – – – – –
Fraction 1.000 .069 .043 .085 .046 .037
Notes: The specification also includes variables for relatively stable two-parent family (i.e., T and B-S1; .637), one event in stage 2
(i.e., T-D2 and B-S2; .035), and other (anything falling outside the categories; .048).
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Table A.4.  Family Structure Histories and a Complementarity Across Stages Specification.
        One or more transitions in stage(s):
Family Structure History
Sample
fraction
1 2 3 1 and 2 1 and 3
or
2 and 3
 1. Two-parent family, always (T) .613 . . . . .
 2. Two parent, divorce stage 1 (T - D1) .032 1 . . . .
 3. Two parent, divorce stage 1, stepfather stage 1 (T - D1 - S1) .004 1 . . . .
 4. Two parent, divorce stage 1, stepfather stage 2 (T - D1 - S2) .015 . . . 1 .
 5. Two parent, divorce stage 1, stepfather stage 3 (T - D1 - S3) .003 . . . . 1
 6. Two parent, divorce stage 2 (T - D2) .034 . 1 . . .
 7. Two parent, divorce stage 2, stepfather stage 2 (T - D2 - S2) .016 . 1 . . .
 8. Two parent, divorce stage 2, stepfather stage 3 (T - D2 - S3) .011 . . . . 1
 9. Two parent, divorce stage 3 (T - D3) .037 . . 1 . .
10. Two parent, divorce stage 3, stepfather stage 3 (T - D3 - S3) .008 . . 1 . .
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             One or more transitions in stage(s):
Family Structure History (continued)
Sample
fraction
1 2 3 1 and 2 1 and 3
or
2 and 3
11. Birth mother only, always (B) .024 . . . . .
12. Birth mother, stepfather stage 1 (B - S1) .020 1 . . . .
13. Birth mother, stepfather stage 1, divorce stage 1 (B - S1 - D1) .001 1 . . . .
14. Birth mother, stepfather stage 1, divorce stage 2 (B - S1 - D2) .007 . . . 1 .
15. Birth mother, stepfather stage 1, divorce stage 3 (B - S1 - D3) .003 . . . . 1
16. Birth mother, stepfather stage 2 (B - S2) .003 . 1 . . .
17. Birth mother, stepfather stage 2, divorce stage 2 (B - S2 - D2) .003 . 1 . . .
18. Birth mother, stepfather stage 2, divorce stage 3 (B - S2 - D3) .003 . . . . 1
19. Birth mother, stepfather stage 3 (B - S3) .0004 . . 1 . .
20. Birth mother, stepfather stage 3, divorce stage 3 (B - S3 - D3) .003 . . 1 . .
21. None of the above .159 – – – – –
Fraction 1.000 .075 .070 .082 .051 .062
Notes: The specification also includes variables for no transitions (.626) and at least one transition in each of the three stages (.035).
